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THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATIONt
Arthur Larson*
Workmen's compensation is a mechanism for providing cash wage
benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected injuries, and for
placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the consumer, through
the medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on in the cost of
the product.
The typical workmen's compensation act has these features: (a) the
basic operating principle is that an employee is automatically entitled
to certain benefits whenever he suffers a "personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment"; (b) negligence and
fault are largely immaterial, both in the sense that the employee's
contributory negligence does not lessen his rights and in the sense that
the employer's complete freedom from fault does not lessen his liability;
(c) coverage is limited to persons having the status of employee, as
distinguished from independent contractor; (d) benefits to the employee
include cash wage benefits, usually around one-half to two thirds of his
average weekly wage, and hospital and medical expenses; in death
cases benefits for dependents are provided; arbitrary maximum and mini-
mum limits are ordinarily imposed; (e) the employee and his dependents,
in exchange for these modest but assured benefits, give up their com-
mon-law right to sue the employer for damages for any injury covered
by the act; (f) the right to sue third persons whose negligence caused
the injury remains, however, with the proceeds usually being applied
first to reimbursement of the employer for the compensation outlay, the
balance (or most of it) going to the employee; (g) administration is
typically in the hands of administrative commissions; and, as far as
possible, rules of procedure, evidence, and conflict of laws are relaxed
to facilitate the achievement of the beneficent purposes of the legislation;
and (h) the employer is required to secure his liability through private,
insurance, state fund insurance in some states, or "self-insurance";
thus the burden of compensation liability does not remain upon the
employer but passes to the consumer, since compensation premiums, as
part of the cost of production, will be reflected in the price of the product.
t From the introductory chapters of a forthcoming treatise entitled The Law of
Workmen's Compensation, to be published in two volumes by Matthew Bender & Company,
Albany, N. Y. Copyright 1952, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 256, for biographical data.
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The sum total of these ingredients is a unique system which is neither
a branch of tort law nor social insurance of the British or continental
type, but which has some of the characteristics of each. Like tort, but
unlike social insurance, its operative mechanism is unilateral employer
liability, with no contribution by the employee or the state; like social
insurance, but unlike tort, the right to benefits and amount of benefits
are based largely on a social theory of providing support and preventing
destitution, rather than settling accounts between two individuals accord-
ing to their personal deserts or blame.
A correctly balanced underlying concept of the nature of workmen's
compensation is indispensable to an understanding of current cases and
to a proper drafting and interpretation of compensation acts. Almost
every major error that can be observed in the development of compensa-
tion law,. whether judicial or legislative, can be traced either to the
importation of tort ideas, or, less frequently, to the assumption that the
right to compensation resembles the right to the proceeds of an insurance
policy.
Among common-law trained lawyers and judges, it has naturally been
the tort-connection fallacy that has been most prevalent.' The effect on
day-to-day compensation decisions may be shown in a few widely-assorted
examples. One was the attempt, in the early years. of compensation
development, to read "arising out of the employment" as if it were "proxi-
mately caused by the employment,"2 with accompanying rules of fore-
seeability and intervening cause. The most familiar and persistent effect
is the difficulty lawyers and judges feel in reconciling themselves to the
notion that the employee's misconduct causing his own injury must
really be altogether disregarded. So, in various forms such as "added-
risk" doctrines, and in various troublesome categories, such as assault
and horseplay cases, fault concepts have at times crept into compensation
decisions. Failure to make a clean break with tort thinking can be harmful
to the employer as well as to the employee. For example, the cases8
I See, for example, HARPER, A TRFATiSE ON THE LAW or TORT 415 (1933): ". . . it
seems clear that the legislature has merely substituted for the old remedies a scheme of
liability which, in its broad outline, is fundamentally tort in nature, closely resembling
in legal principle and social philosophy, that of common-law strict liability."
2 See, for example, the former Massachusetts rule as expressed in Madden's Case, 222
Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 L.R.A. 1916D, 1000 (1916); and HARmxR, LAW Or TORTS 432.
3 Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S. E. 2d 35 (1940) ; Lavin v. Goldberg
Building Material Corp., 274 App. Div. 690, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (1949); following De
Coigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251 App. Div. 662, 297 N.Y. Supp. 636 (1937). Note
that the above criticism applies only when the employer does not personally participate
in the assault; if he himself commits or directs the assault, the employee should have
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which hold that the employer may be personally liable in tort for assaults
deliberately committed by his supervisory employees, as against the
employer's defense of exclusive compensation coverage, are wrong because
they import into the compensation system a concept of employer liability
for vice-principal which was developed in the late nineteenth century
solely to get around the fellow-servant defense to tort actions against
the employer. A less conspicuous example of distortion of compensa-
tion law by tort concepts will be seen in the attempt to define an employee,
for compensation purposes, by tests which were developed to determine
when a master should be liable for the torts of a servant to a third person.
And -even in such an incidental field as conflict of laws, one encounters
confusion caused by early attempts to determine which compensation
act applies in an out-of-state injury by the tort rule of lex loci delicti.
Since the concept of compensation as a kind of strict-liability tort has
had such widespread acceptance among lawyers and such widespread
effects on compensation decisions, most of the following discussion of the
inherent nature of workmen's compensation has been cast in the form
of a demonstration of concrete reasons why compensation cannot properly
be so regarded. This discussion is intended to do two things at once:
dispel the strict-liability-tort fallacy, and at the same time provide a quick
survey of the most distinctive specific characteristics of workmen's
compensation. Then, to balance the picture, several features showing
contrasts with social insurance will be discussed, with the object of
indicating the unique intermediate character of workmen's compensa-
tion as it has developed in the United States.
I. COMPENSATION DISTINGUISHED FROM TORT
(a) The Test of Liability: Work-connection Versus Fault
The right to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: was
there a work-connected injury? Negligence, and, for the most part,
fault, are not in issue and cannot affect the result. Let the employer's
conduct be flawless in its perfection, and let the employee's be abysmal
in its clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude: if the accident arises out of
and in the course of the employment, the employee receives his award.
Reverse-the positions, with a careless and stupid employer and a wholly-
innocent employee: the same award issues.
Thus, the test is not the relation of an individual's personal quality
(fault) to an event, but the relationship of an event to an employment.
the option to sue at common law, since the defendant employer, having intentionally
harmed the employee, cannot be heard to say that the injury was accidental.
[Vol. 37
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The essence of applying the test is not a matter of assessing blame, but
of marking out boundaries.
(b) Underlying Social Philosophy
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief
in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified and most
certain form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-
connected injuries which an enlightened community would feel obliged
to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating
the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment,
the consumer of the product.
Let us approach the abstract question of underlying philosophy by
taking a typical concrete example of industrial injury. Suppose claimant
has worked for ten years at a drill press, at a salary which is not calcu-
lated to enable him to accumulate private annuities to care for him if
he should have to stop working. The rules require him to wear a safety
harness, and, although it is a hot and uncomfortable appliance, he has
worn it faithfully until the day of the injury, when, in a moment of
carelessness, he operates the machine without the harness and crushes
both his hands.
A system of law based in any degree on individual merit at the instant
of the accident can see only one result: non-liability. The employee not
only was negligent, but violated a safety rule. The employer, on the
other hand, had thoughtfully provided a safety device and had done all
he could by enforcing a rule requiring its use. To require the innocent
employer to pay the "guilty" employee might seem to flout the entire
moral basis of law. In an entirely individualistic moral code, this might
be so, but let us see what happens when considerations of social morality
are introduced.
The society surrounding the disabled man can do one of three things:
First, it can refuse all aid, and let him starve in the street, or let him
squat on the sidewalk with a few yellow pencils and beg for pennies
from those who were yesterday his equals. Since the reign of Queen
Elizabeth, no Anglo-American community has considered this a morally-
acceptable solution.
Second, it can put him on county relief, or some other form of direct
hand-out. This, while better than the first, is a poor solution in at least
two ways: it stigmatizes the man as a pauper, and it places the cost on
the political or geographical subdivision where he happens to have his
residence, although that subdivision had no connection with the injury.
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Third, it can grant him Workmen's Compensation, thus preserving
his dignity and self-respect as an injured veteran of industry, which is
psychologically and morally the best of the three solutions, and placing
the cost where it rightly belongs, on the consumers of the product whose
production was the occasion for the injury.
And so, by this simple demonstration of alternatives, we see that
Workmen's Compensation, far from being a violation of moral principle,
is in fact the only morally satisfactory solution of the problem of the
injured workman, once you concede that morality has a group as well
as an individual aspect. Of course, not every compensable injury is of
the severity to present the poorhouse as an alternative to compensation,
but the principle for lesser injuries is the same: they all attempt to
ensure that the claimant continue to receive the bare minimum income
and medical care to keep him from destitution. The ultimate "social
philosophy," then, behind non-fault compensation liability is the desira-
bility of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified and most certain
form, financial and medical benefits which an enlightened community
would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form,
and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate
source of payment.
This statement, of course, is what might be called compensation theory
in pure or idealized form. In the actual statutes, and still more in case-
law interpretations, a greater or less admixture of the "fault" idea will
be found in every jurisdiction. However, the whole story of the develop-
ment of workmen's compensation is a record of movement in the direc-
tion of the "pure theory" stated above, and away from the fault concept.
In the last analysis, it is almost impossible to mix the two theories and
get a satisfactory result. For example, in our opening illustration of the
claimant injured at a drill press through his own failure to use a safety
device, quite a few states still deny compensation altogether, not because
of negligence, of course, but because of the violation of a specific safety
regulation.4 And yet, when the community is confronted with the three
alternatives for the ruined man mentioned above, it is difficult to see in
what respect its social or moral problem is different by reason of that
safety violation. The most "advanced" statutes now penalize this kind
4 AA. CODE tit. 26, § 270 (1940); DEL. REV. CODE c. 175, § 6106 (1935) ; FLA. STAT.
§ 440.09(3) (1943) ; GA. CODE ANx. § 114-105 (1937); IND. STAT. ANw. § 40-1208 (Bums
1933) ; KAN. GFw. STAT. AN. § 44-501 (1935); ONLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 11 (1941); S. D.
CODE § 64.0202 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6861 (Williams 1934); VA. CODE A.N. § 65-35
(1950); W. VA. CODE AwN. § 2527 (1949).
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of momentary violation of safety rules by percentage deductions rather
than complete loss of benefits.'
It has sometimes been erroneously said that the policy basis for absolute
Workmen's Compensation liability resembles the policy basis which gave
rise to strict liability in tort, in Rylands v. Fletcher,6 wild animal cases,
blasting and what the Restatement of Torts calls "ultra-hazardous
activities"." The rationale of strict liability in these latter cases is usually
put thus: when a man carries on a hazardous undertaking which has
sufficient social utility to prevent the law from forbidding it altogether,
the law will permit him to carry it on only on condition that he assume
liability without fault for any consequent injuries. So, the argument
runs, when an employer embarks on an enterprise, there is a strong
probability of personal injuries sooner or later, and accordingly he may
be made to assume absolute liability for these injuries when they do
occur.
The fallacies in this analogy are many, but it will suffice to state the
most obvious one: employment generally is not ultra-hazardous in the
sense used in strict liability tort cases. It is true that a handful of
statutes, for historical and now invalid reasons having to do with attempts
to ensure constitutionality, are on their face limited to "hazardous"
employments, but most statutes are not so limited.' If employment,
regardless of nature, is "hazardous" in this sense (i.e., that accidents
will eventually happen), then so is driving a car, operating a household,
or perhaps just living at all-and absolute liability should be the rule for
all mishaps flowing from these activities. In any case, consistency would
demand that an employer's liability to outsiders for all injuries caused
by operation of his business be also absolute, for if it is ultrahazardous
for the purpose of strict liability to employees, it must be the same for
the purpose of liability to strangers.
Of course, some employments are hazardous, but others are not; and
when injury does in fact occur, benefits are just as necessary under the
social philosophy of compensation in the latter case as in the former.
5 N. C. GEN. STAT. AxN. § 97-12 (1950), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 7035-15 (1942) (10%
reduction); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342-165 (1945), Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287-120 (1949),
UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-1-11 (1943), Wis. STAT. § 102-58 (1949) (15%) ; COLO. STAT. ANN.
c. 97, § 362 (1935), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-906 (1941) (50%).
6 [1865] 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774; [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265; [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
7 RESTATE xNT, TORTS §§ 519-524 (1938).
8 Nine states confine coverage largely to hazardous employments: Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. In
Illinois the classification makes the difference between automatic and elective coverage.
In New York it avoids the requirement of having four or more workmen or operatives.
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(c) Significance of Difference in Defenses
The retention of the defenses of act of God, act of third person and
some kinds of contributory negligence in so-called strict tort liability,
and their unavailability in compensation law, show that the former is
ultimately based on fault, while the latter is not.
While the mistaken grouping of compensation with strict tort liability
is due partly to a misunderstanding of compensation, it is also due partly
to the erroneous idea that so-called "strict tort liability" is indeed "abso-
lute liability without regard to fault." The simplest way to show the
ultimate fault basis of strict tort liability is to examine the significance
of the defenses that remain. Not long after Rylands v. Fletcher (which
was not believed by the court to announce any new principle of liability),
it was decided that act of God9 and act of third person ° were good
defenses. Consent"l or "default"'" of the plaintiff were also recognized
as defenses. This means that the boundaries of strict liability must still
be described in terms based on fault. To relieve the actor of liability in
three instances in which he is affirmatively shown to be free of fault in
precipitating the harm is to indicate both that you have not set up a
true non-fault liability, and that the area in which liabilty remains prob-
ably has some element of fault in it that distinguishes it from the area in
which the three defenses create immunity.
So, if an employer, such as a circus, kept a caged tiger, and if lightning,
or a stranger, or the plaintiff, caused the release of the tiger, there would
under the cases cited be no strict tort liability; but if lightning, a
stranger or a circus employee's own negligence -caused the release and
resulting injury to the employee, there would be compensation liability.
The latter is true liability without regard to fault; the former is not 3
(d). Nature of injuries and elements of damage compensated
In compensation, unlike 'tort, the only injuries compensated for are
9 Nichols v. Marsland, [1875] L.R. 2 Ex. D. 1, 259.
1o Box v. Jubb, [1879] L. R. 4 Ex. D. 76.
I Atty.-Gen. v. Cory Bros. & Co., [1921] 1 A. C. 521, 539.
12 Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 279, per Blackburn, J. The "default" here
referred to is the escape of the dangerous thing or substance due to plaintiff's fault. The
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 524 (1938), bars recovery if plaintiff intentionally or negligently
caused the activity to miscarry or, after knowledge of the imminent miscarriage, failed
to use reasonable care to avoid harm to himself; it permits recovery if plaintiff's "default"
consisted merely of negligent failure to observe that the dangerous activity was being
carried on or of intentional coming into the dangerous area. In this state of the law, the
broad statement in some Torts texts that contributory negligence is not a defense to
strict liability seems to be misleading.
13 STALYBRASS, SAIa ONr's LAW Or TORTS 541 (10th ed. 1945).
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those which produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning
power.
For this reason, some classes of injuries which result in verdicts of
thousands of dollars at common law produce no award whatever under
a compensation statute. 4 For example, while common-law verdicts of
great size are common for facial disfigurement, it is usually held that,
in the absence of an express provision making disfigurement compensable,
no allowance can be made for it. More than half of the states now have
such express provisions, but, significantly, the basis in most instances
is still the argument that a repellent appearance may diminish the claim-
ant's chances of obtaining and holding employment. Similarly, impair-
ment or destruction of sexual potency is not in itself a basis for an award,
and, presumably the same result would apply to such an injury as destruc-
tion of child-bearing capacity in a woman.
The limitation of compensation to "disability" also runs consistently
through all questions of elements of damage. To take a familiar example:
there is no place in compensation law for damages on account of pain
and suffering, however dreadful they may be. So also in death benefit
cases, compensation law refuses to recognize such items as loss of con-
sortium or conscious suffering of the deceased in the interval preceding
death.
(e) Amount of compensation
A compensation system, unlike a tort recovery, does not pretend to
restore to the claimant what he has lost; it gives him a sum which,
added to his remaining earning ability, if any, will presumably enable
him to exist without being a burden to others. If our compensation theory
is correct, then the amount of compensation awarded may be expected
to go not much higher than is necessary to keep the worker from
destitution. This is indeed so.
Up to a certain point, the amount of compensation for disability de-
pends on the worker's previous earnings level, for most acts award a
percentage of average wage, somewhere between half and two-thirds.
But practically all acts also set a maximum in terms of dollars per week
at a level which can hardly be termed anything but bare subsistence.
Most of these maxima for total disability run between $20 and $35 a week.
Thus, a bricklayer earning $3 an hour and taking home over a hundred
dollars a week may find himself reduced to $25-a-week level and forced
14 Ingle v. Mills, 204 S. C. 505, 30 S. E. 2d 301 (1944) ; Shaw v. Salt River Valley Water
Users' Ass'n, 69 Ariz. 309, 213 P. 2d 378 (1950).
1952]
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to accommodate his previous $100-a-week standard of living to one-
fourth that amount.
It is not intended here to argue the adequacy of the compensation
scale;' the present point is simply to show one more fundamental point
of cleavage between compensation and tort. For this purpose, it is
equally significant that, under the dollar minima (mostly in the $5-$15
range), it is at least conceivable that an employee, working with sufficient
regularity to come under an Act, but yet at a total income far below the
minimum, might be awarded a weekly income for total disability which
is several times that which he has been earning.
Even among those who contend that the scale of benefits is generally
too low, there are few if any who would contend that anything resembling
tort principles of amount of recovery should be imported into compen-
sation law. It was never intended that compensation payments should
equal actual loss, for the reason, if no other, that such a scale would
encourage malingering and trumped-up claims.
(f) Ownership of the Award
The recipient of installment payments does not ordinarily "own" the
unpaid balance of the award so as to entitle his heirs as such to any
interest in it. 6
Not only is the award trimmed on all sides-as to kind of injury,
elements of damage, and maximum dollar amount-to ensure that it can
never exceed the amount necessary to prevent want during disability;
the award itself is completely cut off in most jurisdictions when, through
the death of the worker without dependents, for example, there is no
further need to worry about anyone's becoming destitute. Thus, if a
claimant has been awarded $20 a week for 300 weeks, and dies without
dependents after 100 weeks, his heirs usually have no claim upon the
unpaid $4000. So the making of an award for disability, far from being
an adversary recovery of damages by an injured plaintiff from a defendant
guilty of some kind of constructive responsibility for the accident, is
rather the signal for the setting in motion of a scheme of social protection
which goes no further in nature, amount or duration than the necessities
of that protection require.'7
15 For a thorough analysis of this subject, see REEDE, ADEQUACy oF COmPENSATION (1947).
16 Turner v. Christian Heurich Brewing Co., 169 F. 2d 681 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
17 By sfhecial statutory amendment this rule has been altered in some jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Moffat Coal Co. v. McFall, 117 Col. 191, 186 P.2d 1021 (1947) ; Mt. Oliver & Staunton
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 394 Ill. 377, 68 N.E. 2d 771 (1946); Vander Heiden
v. Industrial Commission, 246 Wisc. 543, 17 N. W. 2d 898 (1945).
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(g) Significance of insurance
In compensation theory, liability is not supposed to hurt the employer
as it helps the employee, since the loss is normally passed on to the
consumer. Of course, insurance of many kinds of tort liability is a famil-
iar feature of modern law, and we do not, in theory, allow the presence
of insurance to alter our conception of the rights and liabilities of the
actual parties. But compensation insurance is a little different, for it is
normally an integral part of the whole scheme. Most insurance, even
where semi-compulsory, is exclusively concerned with providing a fund
for possible plaintiffs. Compensation insurance too has this primary
object, .but it is also designed to provide the route whereby the cost of
the compensation system is passed on to the consuming public in orderly
fashion.
One of the best indications of this distinction is the fact that the im-
practicability of insuring a particular class of employers, such as private
householders, or of employees, such as domestic servants, is usually
recognized as reason enough for omitting them from compensation
coverage."' Of course, under an experience rating system the employer
may indirectly feel some impact of frequent or large claims in the form
of increased insurance premiums, but apart from this, the American
compensation system, unlike the tort system, at the moment of creating
the liability also creates the means of relieving the employer of the real
burden of that liability."9
3,8 Riesenfeld, who in his brilliant lecture in the Gleason series entitled Forty Years of
Workmen's Compensation, expressed some disagreement with the view here stated, never-
theless observed later in his lecture, when speaking of the exemption of casual and non-
business workers, ". . . there is perhaps some reason for such exemption in view of the
difficulty of insurance coverage for occasional work." See 7 N. A. C. C. A. L. J. 15, 20, 26
(1951).
19 Observe that this question of the theoretical impact of compensation liability on the
individual employer is an entirely different matter from the question whether the relative
generosity of compensation in a particular jurisdiction subjects the industry of an entire
state to a competitive disadvantage. For example, when Wisconsin began to compensate
for silicosis before its neighbors did, its granite and monument works had to shut down.
See also Home, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1951, p. 1, col. 2, Sept. 11, 1951, p. 18, col. 1,
and Sept. 12, 1951, p. 26, col. 2, on the general theme that '"ndustry in New York State
fears it is losing its competitive standing because of the cost of workmen's compensation."
This problem is not of the essence of compensation law as such, since competitive disadvantage
would not exist if all states maintained the same level of benefits and followed one
theoretically-correct standard of interpretation. But, while the financial aspects of
compensation are not within the province of this article, it is well to bear in mind that
there is a direct relation between the relative liberality of the competing judicial doctrines




II. AMERICAN SYSTEM DISTINGUISHED FROM SOCIAL INSURANCE
(a) Private Character of the System
The emphasis above on the features of compensation which distinguish
it from tort, such as its social philosophy, its relation of awards to
disability rather than loss, and its distribution of the cost to the consumer,
may give the impression that the compensation system is virtually a kind
of social security or social insurance plan. To restore a balanced im-
pression of the American system, one must contrast it with the systems
that are truly public and socialistic, such as the British and New Zealand
plans;20 this done, it becomes apparent that the present American system
is neither tort nor socialism, but something between.
Though social in philosophy, the American compensation system is
largely private in structure, being a matter between employers, insurance
carriers and employees, while under typical socialistic schemes the govern-
ment becomes the central figure.
A very brief description of the British and New Zealand plans may be
given at the outset, with other details to be added as they become relevant.
Of the two, the New Zealand system illustrates the final "all out" develop-
ment of comprehensive social security, while the British plan retains some
compromises with the past.
In the New Zealand plan,2' the separate identity of workmen's com-
pensation, and of industrial or occupational injury or disease as such,
has disappeared. The system is financed by registration fees and income
taxes with no special reference to employment, and benefits are paid for
sickness, accident, invalidism, and death without distinction between
occupational and non-occupational origin, as well as for old age, widow-
hood, orphans, families, war injuries to civilians, unemployment and
other emergencies.
The British plan22 retains the identity of Workmen's Compensation to
some extent. Workmen's Compensation becomes a part of the compre-
hensive security system, along with retirement, unemployment, sickness,
maternity, widows', orphans', family and death benefits; it is under the
same overall administration by the Ministry of National Insurance; but
20 See ME.iA-m, RELIEF AND SoclI. SECURITY, Part II (1946).
21 See THE NEW ZEALAND OFFCIAL YEARBOOK, and an official government pamphlet
describing the system entitled SocIAL SECURITY MONETARY BENEFITS AND WAR PENSIONS.
22 National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 9 & 10 GEO. 6, c. 62 (1946, effective
1948). Other parts of the over-all legislative scheme are: National Insurance Act, 9 & 10
Gao. 6, c. 67 (1946 effective 1948); Ministry of National Insurance Act, 7 & 8 GEo. 6, c.
46 (1944) ; Family Allowances Act, 8 & 9 GEo. 6, c. 41 (1945) ; and the National Health
Service Act, 9 & 10 GEO. 6, c. 81 (1946).
[Vol. 3 7
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there is an Industrial Injuries Fund separate from the National Insurance
Funds under which most of the other benefits are financed. The most
important difference is the substantially higher benefits for occupational
disability than for non-occupational. For example, a married man who
is totally and permanently disabled and unemployable will receive eighty-
one shillings a week if the disability is under the Workmen's Compen-
sation portion of the plan, but only forty-two shillings a week if the
invalidity is non-occupational.' Unlike the New Zealand plan, this plan
calls for special contributions by the parties: five-twelfths by the em-
ployer, five-twelfths by the employee and two-twelfths by the Exchequer;
but the fund is, of course, public, and the handling of liability through
private insurance or self-insurance is abolished.
By contrast with these plans, which are representative of systems in
force on the continent and elsewhere, the American system begins to
look conspicuously individualistic. Except in the few states which require
insurance in a State Fund, employers are generally free to make private
arrangements for the securing of their liability, either by carrying liability
insurance or by qualifying as "self-insurers." So far as government par-
ticipation is concerned, while the whole process is in a sense under admin-
istrative supervision, the government's role is confined largely to the
settlement of disputed claims.
The real clue to the character of each system is the source of financing:
in the American it is typically premiums paid by the employer and
passed on to a particular consuming group; in the British it is "pre-
miums" paid equally by employer and employee, with a small addition
by the government; in New Zealand it is general taxes. So the American
system retains the concept of employer liability, though presumably passed
on to the consumer in the price of the product; the British scheme seems
to abandon this idea altogether, in favor of the idea that the employee,
with the aid of his employer and to a lesser degree of the government,
purchases a sort of insurance policy from the government against occu-
pational injury; the New Zealand system rejects both these ideas, and
proceeds upon the theory that the state generally has an obligation to
provide a certain minimum subsistence to all its members whose earnings
are interrupted for any reason.
2 Another important distinction is that in order to receive this non-occupational benefit
for an unlimited period the recipient must have paid in 156 weekly contributions; otherwise
the maximum benefit period is one year. The benefits. for occupational injury, however,
are in no way dependent on the extent or duration of the employee's contributions. As
to hospital and medical benefits, however, as distinguished from cash benefits for wage




(b) Allocation of burden, and relation of hazard to liability
Unlike social insurance plans, the American compensation system does
not place the cost on the "public" as such, but on a particular class of
consumers, and thus retains a relation between the hazardousness of
particular industries and the cost of the system to that industry and
consumers of its product. It is not quite accurate to say, as is often
said, that the "public" ultimately pays the cost of workmen's compen-
sation. Such a statement is literally true in New Zealand, but in America
it is more precise to say that the consumer of a particular product ulti-
mately pays the cost of compensation protection for the workers engaged
in its manufacture. Between these two apparently similar methods of
distributing the cost of protection there is actually a far-reaching
difference. Some employments, like logging and lumbering, are highly
dangerous; others, of a clerical and sedentary nature, involve a mini-
mum of hazard. Under the American system, the size of the insurance
premiums will vary according to the degree of hazard, while in New
Zealand, the safe industry will pay taxes at the same rate as the dangerous.
In this respect the British plan resembles New Zealand's, for the amount
of contribution is uniform, and does not vary according to the hazardous-
ness of the industry. The Minister's report gives a special reason for
this rather surprising feature of its plan: the extra levy for hazardous
industries "would fall most heavily on certain important industries which
have to meet foreign competition."24
In certain competitive situations, the choice of theory here could
assume great importance. For example, suppose that two building ma-
terials, like stone and brick, are in close competition; the burden of
high compensation premiums because of the prevalence of silicosis in
the stone-cutting industry might, if that industry bore the full weight of
it, drive that product from the market, while under the New Zealand or
British plans there would be no such disadvantage. Where experience
rating, i.e., the adjustment of premium on the basis of past accident and
liability record, is applied to individual employers, this competitive im-
pact is carried one step further, in that an individual employer with a
bad safety record might conceivably in time incur premiums so high
that his cost of production would not permit him to compete.
Thus, while by contrast with tort liability, the American compensation
system seems to have eliminated all consideration of fault, a comparison
with true social insurance reveals that other systems have gone much
further along that road, by relieving not only individual employers but
24 M TRsmy or RECONSTRUcTION, SOCIAL INSURANCE REPORT, Pt. I, ff 31(v).
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entire industries of all financial responsibility for the extent of injury-
producing conditions which, avoidably or unavoidably, they maintain.
(c) Qualification for and measure of benefits
The American system does not, like a true security system, make
actual need the test and measure of compensation; its measure is a
compromise between actual loss of earning capacity and arbitrary pre-
sumptions of the amount needed for support. In the sections above
contrasting measure of recovery in compensation and tort, the emphasis
was on the many ways in which compensation did not compensate for
actual loss in the sense that tort recoveries are supposed to do. But
when the comparison is with the British or New Zealand plans it becomes
clear that the compensation system is still far from being a relief system
based on actual need.
In New Zealand, benefits for all sickness or accident claimants tem-
porarily incapacitated for work are uniform, without respect to previous
earnings, except that payments cannot be greater than previous earnings.
The size of benefits varies only according to the number of dependents;
a man gets a pound a week, fifteen shillings for his wife, and ten shillings
and sixpence for each dependent child. The Commission has power to
reduce these amounts in the light of other income or property of the
claimant. For total permanent disability, the claimant receives the
standard rate of eighty-four pounds ten shillings per year, with additional
amounts for dependents; but here an automatic "means test" comes in.
The total allowable income, of benefits plus independent income from
other sources, is £162.10.0. This means that if an invalided employee
has an income of his own of £162.10.0 a year, he simply receives no
benefits at all; if his independent income is less than that, his benefits
are so scaled that his total income is still £162.10.0.
Britain, however, has a history of violent opposition to the principle
of the "means test," and this is reflected in the present benefit system.
The present British scale departs sharply from traditional compensation
practice by disregarding previous earnings entirely; as in New Zealand,
benefits are uniform for all individuals, and vary only according to
number of dependents. But while the measure is thus a sort of presumed
need, as disinguished from actual loss of earnings, no inquiry into actual
need is permitted as in New Zealand. In fact, in the case of prolonged
or permanent disability, the basic "pension" is not affected by subsequent
earnings of the claimant.' In this respect, the British system seems
25 If the recipient is able to earn more than £52 a year, he is not entitled to the
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quite inconsistent with any theory of scaling benefits to need, and in
fact, goes far beyond American compensation practice which would re-
open the case of a compensation claimant who is drawing compensation
payments as totally disabled and holding a job at the same time. Another
departure from the "need" idea, and a reversion almost toward tort
damage concepts, is the statement that the "pension" for prolonged dis-
ability is related not to loss of earning capacity but, according to the
foreword of the Minister's Report, to "whatever he has lost in health,
strength and the power to enjoy life."
26
The typical American compensation act relates the award to the dis-
ability or loss of earning capacity, in many injuries fixing arbitrary
periods of disability for loss of particular members; and, within the
maximum and minimum limits, the amount of the award will be a
percentage of and therefore will vary according to previous weekly
wages. This reference to previous wage level is the significant point of
distinction between the American system and the other two, and shows
that it is not an outright relief plan, since, within limits, it relates the
amount of recovery to the amount of wage loss, makes no inquiry into
actual need by any sort of means test, and, with a few statutory excep-
tions, makes no allowance even for presumed degree of need because of
number of dependents.
(d) Retroactive Unilateral Eniployer Liability
While the objective of American workmen's compensation-the pro-
tection against wage loss-classes it with other forms of social insurance
such as old-age and unemployment insurance, it differs from them in
its utilization of the mechanism of employer liability. This distinction
has some importance practical consequences. In the typical social insur-
ance scheme, the employer's worries are largely over when he makes his
regular contributions to the fund. The employee's status as a member
of the scheme is usually fixed in advance, often because the system is
contributory and the employee is covered only if his contributions are
on record. By contrast, the workmen's compensation claimant's status
is determined in retrospect. Many a startled householder has found him-
self suddenly presented with a workmen's compensation claim by some
handy-man who was hired to fix the roof or build a chicken-coop.
27
"unemployability supplement" of twenty shillings a week; but the basic pension of
forty-five shillings for a single man under total permanent incapacity will not be reduced
or reconsidered because of actual earnings.
26 MNISTRy OF RECONSTRUCTION, SOCIAL INSURANCE REPORT, Pt. II, ff 31(v).
27 The claims have invariably been unsuccessful. Coffin v. Hook, 112 Ind. App. 549, 49
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Occasionally an entire category of employees, never thought covered by
their employers, are swept retroactively within the compensation act by
judicial decision, as when Gordon v. New York Life Insurance Co.2s
in effect made all full-time commission life insurance salesmen em-
ployees in New York. It is in such situations that the employer is made to
realize that the essence of his obligation is not merely to make periodic
payments into some social insurance system, but to bear any employer
liability that any court may impose upon him under the court's current
interpretation of compensation law. If the employer has guessed wrong,
and has carried no compensation insurance, the liability he bears will
not, from his point of view, look much like social insurance.2
The principal practical consequence is that the coverage of an Ameri-
can-type compensation act cannot necessarily be expected to follow
wherever the Social Security act, for example, may lead, such as into the
area of domestic service, without some thought on whether the domestic
employer's liability can be made both predictable and insurable.
III. BACKGROUND OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
In tracing the origins of the Workmen's Compensation idea in
Western law, one is tempted to speculate on the significance of a few
fragments of ancient law which might be said to represent a crude
equivalent of the modern principle. In the Laws of Henry I, dating
from about the year 1100, occurs a passage which may be translated
as follows:
And in some cases a man cannot legitimately swear that another was
not, through himself, further from life and nearer to death; among which
cases are these: If anyone, on the mission of another, is the cause of
death in the course of the errand; if anyone sends for someone, and the
latter is killed in coming; if anyone meets death having been called by
another .... 30
Similarly, Brunner describes the rule in early Germanic law as follows:
The master was liable for the wergeld of the workman if the latter lost
his life in the service, and for the appropriate money-payment if he was
injured,-so far as the injury could not be imputed to some third person
N.E. 2d 369 (1942) ; Larson v. Hergert, 5 N. J. Super. 367, 69 A. 2d 218 (1949); Craine
v. Department of Labor & Industries, 19 Wash. 2d 75, 141 P. 2d 129 (1943) ; Weatherford
v. Arter, 63 S. E. 2d 572 (W. Va. 1951).
28 300 N.Y. 652, 90 N.E. 2d 898 (1950) (4-3 decision).
29 For an able presentation of a view of compensation insurance at variance with the
view here expressed, see Riesenfeld, Forty Years of Workmen's Compensation, 7 N. A. C. C
A. L. . 15, 21 (1951), who holds that the real characteristic of social insurance is that
the employee is assured of getting his benefits from someone.
30 Leges Regis Henrici Primi, XC, 6.
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for whom the master (who had to answer for the misdeeds of his own
people) was not responsible. If one who was in the service of another
lost his life by misadventure, by reason of a tree or of fire or of water,
the accident was imputed to the master as homicidium. If one person
sent another away or summoned him on the former's business, and the
latter lost his life while executing the order, the former was taken as the
causa mortis.31
This liability was not based on a consciously enlightened social policy,
but apparently on the primitive concept of causation. As the first quota-
tion indicates, a person accused of having had some responsibility for a
death had to take the oath that the deceased was not, through him, further
from life and nearer death. If the accused had sent the deceased on the
fatal mission, or had set in motion the employment in which deceased
was killed, the accused could not legitimately swear that oath. It was
the "but-for" theory of causation in undiluted form.
But perhaps there is more here than the accidental by-product of a
causation theory. We are told by sociologists that any settled society
eventually works out a conscious or unconscious solution of the problem
of the disabled and helpless member; it may be a family system that
fills the need, or a clan, or a feudal manor, or a national state. In any
case, it is amazing to reflect that a thousand years ago-for whatever
reason-there may have been a more "modern" social principle for taking
care of injured workmen than existed in the United States until the
twentieth century.
So far as law on the subject of master's liability to his injured servant
is concerned, the period from 1000-1837 A.D. seems to be a complete
blank. Perhaps the primitive rule met the problem for a time, since this
basic concept, of responsibility survived into the fifteenth century.
Beginning about 1700, the principle of vicarious liability of the master
for torts of the servant was developed, through a tour de force by Lord
Holt in such cases as Jones v. Hart,32 aided by Lord Raymond, who, in
his 1743 reports,"3 converted Holt's hypothetical examples of negligent
servants into actual actions brought and decided at Guildhall. Since the
statements of the respondeat superior rule at this stage were in sweeping,
unqualified terms ("the act of a servant is the act of his master"),"
31 2 BRuNzRE, DEUTSCE REC HTSGESCHICETE 549 (1892) cited in Wigmore, Responsibility
for Tortious Acts, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315, 383, 442 (1894); 3 WiGi oE, Fr.EUND, MIxKELL,
SELECT ESSAYS 32T AxGLO-AERiCAN LEGAL HISTORY 474, 481 (1909).
32 Nisi Prius, [16981 K.B. 642, 2 Salk. 441. See Holmes, The History of Agency, 4
Hmv. L. REv. 345, 5 id. 1 (1892); 3 WIGmORE ET A., SELEct ESSAYS 32T ANGLo-ARIERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 368 (1909); and Wigmore, supra note 31.
3 1. Ld. Raym. 739 (K. B. 1743) ("as he heard it from 'Magister Place'").
34 Jones v. Hart, supra note 32, per Holt, J.
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presumably a master would be liable to a servant injured by the negli-
gence of a fellow-servant. There was nothing in the rule as then stated
limiting its benefits to strangers.
In 1837, Lord Abinger invented the fellow-servant exception to the
general rule of master's vicarious liability, in his famous Priestley v.
Fowler opinion.85 In that case, the master, a butcher, was held not liable
for the negligence of his servant in overloading a van which broke down
as a result and injured the plaintiff, another employee. The decision was
based largely on what Abinger called "the consequen5es of a decision
the one way or the other," consisting largely of "alarming" examples of
possible master's liability for domestic mishaps due to the negligence of
the chambermaid, the coachman and the cook. If Abinger realized the
unhappy effect of his decision on the injured victims of the industrial age
which was violently erupting all around him, the opinion does not show it.
But when American courts began to follow his lead, as in Farwell v.
Boston & Worcester R. R.3 8 in Massachusetts, holding a railroad immune
from liability to one of its locomotive engineers for injury caused by the
negligence of one of its switchmen, it became clear that the real impli-
cations of the decision involved not butcher-boys and chambermaids, but
trainmen, miners and factory workers.
One is often told that the common law is characterized by its resilient
adaptability-its capacity for providing a remedy for new kinds of injury
as changing conditions make it necessary. How then shall we explain the
paradox of ever-increasing industrial injuries and ever-decreasing judicial
remedies for them? Downey37 suggests as one explanation the prevalence
of laissez-faire in economic thought at this time; Dodd 8 points to the
individualistic tendency of the common law, and the desire of judges to
encourage industrial enterprise by making the burdens as light as possible.
Although legalistic arguments are not wanting (such as the line taken
in the Farwell opinion that the liability of master to servant is governed
not by tort rules but by the "implied contract" between them, which im-
plied contract relieves the master of liability), it is quite obvious that
the real reason for the rule, as finally stated in the same case, was the
prevailing conviction that "considerations of policy and general expe-
diency" required it, since employer liability to employee "would not
conduce to the general good." 9
35 [1837J 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030.
36 4 Metc. 49 (Mass. 1842).
37 E. H. Dowx~y, HISTORy OF WoRx AcCIDENT INDMITY IN IOWA (1912).
38 WALTER F. DODD, ADmInISTRATION OF WORKIM'S COM£PENSATION (1936).
39 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 4 Metc. 49, 61 (Mass. 1842).
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"Assumption of risk" is the second of the three common-law defenses
of the employer. Its seeds may also be found in Priestley v. Fowler,
where Abinger observed that "the servant is not bound to risk his safety
in the service of his master, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service
in which he reasonably apprehends injury to himself; and in most of the
cases in which danger may be incurred, if not in all, he is just as likely
to be acquainted with the probability and extent of it as the master."
The implication is that the employee, being free to do as he pleases, and
voluntarily undergoing the dangerous conditions of the work, has no
standing to complain when injury does occur as a result of these con-
ditions. This idea, based as it is on such phantasms as perfect liquidity
of labor, perfect bargaining equality, and perfect knowledge by workmen
of employment risks and opportunities, needs no refutation in modern
times. However, it too, again with the assistance of Judge Shaw in the
Farwell case, was well established as a defense by the middle of the
nineteenth century.
Contributory negligence, recognized as a defense since Butterfield v.
Forrester"° in 1809, became the third employer defense, so that even
where direct negligence of the employer could be shown, recovery would
be defeated by the negligence-even much smaller in degree--of the
employee.
What then remained of employer's liability? Let us analyze the
grounds of liability statistically, using German figures for 1907,1 since
the German statistics of the period are unusually full and detailed.
Classification of Causes of Accidents:
1. Negligence or fault of employer 16.81%
2. Joint negligence of employer and injured employee 4.66
3. Negligence of fellow-servant 5.28
4. Acts of God 2.31
5. Fault or negligence of injured employee 28.89
6. Inevitable accidents connected with the employment 42.05
It is at once apparent that, with no. 2 and no. 3 barred by common-
law defenses, and with no. 4, 5 and 6 incapable of supporting a cause of
40 11 East 60 (K.B. 1809).
41 These German statistics have been used partly because they contain the most relevant
breakdown by "fault" causes of accidents and partly because they cover a rather broad
base both as to number of employees and as to duration. While only the 1907 figures are
here cited, there are similar figures for 1887 and 1897 which vary only slightly in the
percentage summaries. (ZACHETR, INTRODUCTION TO WoRYMN's INSURANCE 3x GERMAY 14).
The calculation thus covers from four to twenty-one million workers in all kinds of
employment over a period of twenty years.
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action, only under no. 1 is there any possibility of employer liability;
accordingly, the employee at common law was remediless without question
in 83% of all cases.
What of the remaining 16.81%? The defense of assumption of risk
might still apply, for even where the employer was at fault, many cases
42
held that the employee, by continuing to work in spite of the defects or
dangers created by the employer, consented to waive the employer's
obligation.
Moreover, there is quite a difference between classifying an accident
as attributable to employer's fault for statistical purposes, and carrying
through a fruitful lawsuit based on that fault. The common-law duties
of the employer to the employee were of a kind not always easy to assert
in court: to provide and maintain a reasonably safe place to work and
safe appliances, tools and equipment; to provide a sufficient number of
suitable and competent fellow-servants to permit safe performance of
the work; to warn employees of unusual hazards; and to make and
enforce safety rules. Even these duties were sometimes weakened by
the common-law defenses, for if the unsafe condition of the premises,
for example, was due to the negligence of a fellow-servant, the master
in some jurisdictions would not be liable. 2 The employer had only to
exercise the care of a reasonably prudent master, 44 and if the conse-
quences of his breach of duty should have been obvious to the workman,
then it was for the workman to look out for himself.42 One need only
add that the usual witnesses of the accident, being co-employees, would
naturally be reluctant to testify against the employer, to complete the
picture of helplessness which characterized the position of the injured
workman of the pre-compensation era.
It is not surprising that some courts eventually began to try to swing
the pendulum in the other direction, and, although the total effect of
their efforts was small, this was partly because the task of reform was
taken over by legislation. The principal modification of the common-
law defenses was the adoption of the "vice-principal" exception to the
fellow-servant rule. In some of the jurisdictions46 adopting this exception,
42 Russell v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 32 Minn. 230, 20 N.W. 147 (1884);
Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N.Y. 228, 30 N.E. 573 (1892).
43 Henry v. Hudson & M. R. R., 201 N.Y. 140, 94 N.E. 623 (1911); Armour v. Hahn,
111 U.S. 313 (1884).
44 Omaha Bottling Co. v. Theiler, 59 Neb. 257, 80 N.W. 821 (1899).
45 Ragon v. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. R., 97 Mich. 265, 56 N. W. 612, 37 Am. St. Rep.
336 (1893); Vanderpool v. Partridge, 79 Neb. 165, 112 N.W. 318, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 668
(1908); McCarthy v. Mulgrew, 107 Iowa 76, 77 N.W. 527 (1898).
46 Berea Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 287, 27 Am. Rep. 510 (1877) ; Lamb v. Littman,
132 N.C. 978, 44 S.E. 646 (1903).
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it took the form of excluding from the fellow-servant category all em-
ployees in supervisory capacities, such as foremen; in most juris-
dictions,4 7 however, it took the broader form of excluding from the fellow-
servant category all employees charged with carrying out the common-
law duties of the employer. This was, in effect, to say that these duties
-of providing a safe place, safe tools, and so on-were non-delegable.
The only other instances of softening the common-law defenses by
judicial action were the holdings in some, but not all, states that the
employee did not assume the risk of his employer's violation of a safety
statute,4 8 and the modification of the contributory negligence rule in
three states to confine the effect of contributory negligence to the miti-
gation of damages.4 9
It is important to observe that all legislation prior to the Workmen's
Compensation Acts accepted the basic common-law idea that the em-
ployer was liable to the employee only for the negligence or fault of
himself or, at most, of someone for whom he is generally responsible
under the respondeat superior doctrine. These so-called "Employers'
Liability Statutes" did not aspire to create any new principle of liability
applicable to the employment relation as such. The most they ever set
out to accomplish was the restoration of the employee to a position no
worse than that of a stranger injured by the negligence of the employer
or his servants.
The first such acts, 0 beginning with the Georgia Act of 1855, abro-
gated the fellow-servant defense for railway companies only. In 1880,
England, which had judicially rejected the vice-principal rule, legislatively
adopted something like it in the Employers' Liability Act, 1 but, what
with the exceptions, qualifications and pitfalls in the Act itself, and the
prompt judicial holding that a contract waiving an employee's rights
under the Act was not against public policy,5" this first legislative effort
was largely abortive. However, it did serve as a model for a number of
state statutes, and by the time compensation legislation began to take
47 Northern Pac. R. R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642; Tedford v. Los Angeles Electric Co.,
134 Cal. 76, 66 Pac. 76, 54 L.R.A. 85 (1901); Smith v. Erie.R.R., 38 Vroom 636, 67
N.J.L. 636, 52 Atl. 634, 49 L.R.A. 302 (1902); Flike v. Boston & A.R.R., 53 N.Y.
549, 13 Am. Rep. 545 (1873).
48 Fitzwater v. Warren, 206 N.Y. 355, 99 N.E. 1042, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1229 (1912).
49 Augusta & S. R. R. v. McElmurry, 24 Ga. 75 (1858); Galena & C. R. R. v. Jacobs,
20 Ill. 478 (1858); L. N. & S. R. R. v. Fleming, 82 Tenn. 128 (1884).
50 Ga. Laws 1855, p. 155; IA. LAWS 1852, c. 169, § 7; KAN. STAT. 1874, c. 93, § 1; Wis.
LAWS 1875, c. 173; Wyo. TEaR. AcT 1869.
51 43 & 44 VIcT., c.42 (1880).
62 Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q.B.D. 357 (1882).
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over the field in 1911, twenty-five states had some kind of Employers'
Liability Statute.P Many of them abrogated the fellow-servant defense
as to railroads only; some abrogated it more generally or altogether;
some modified it. As to contributory negligence, some adopted instead
the comparative negligence principle, some shifted the burden of proof
on the issue of contributory negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant
in certain jurisdictions where the plaintiff had had the burden of proving
his own freedom from negligence, and some withdrew the defense in
case of violation of a safety statute by the employer. As to assumption
of risk, some destroyed the defense whenever the risk was caused by the
fault of the employer; some destroyed it as to violations of safety
statutes; and some modified it so as to make it inapplicable to extra-
ordinary risks, or known defects in plant or machinery, especially in the
case of railroads. The Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, appli-
cable to those employees of common carriers who are engaged in inter-
state or" foreign commerce, may be regarded as the high point in this
phase of the development of employee protection, for it embodied all
the most advanced features of the state acts up to that time. It provided
that contributory negligence should only mitigate damages, and that
neither this defense nor assumption of risk should apply in case of safety
statute violation; and it made the railroad employer liable for the negli-
gence of all its officers, agents and employees, and for defects due to
negligence in track, equipment, engines, and cars, resulting in injury
to employees.
To preserve a due sense of proportion when analyzing the over-all
effect of these legislative and judicial efforts to ameliorate the common
law, one must glance again at the German statistics on causes of accidents.
Under that table, even if both the fellow-servant defense and contrib-
utory negligence were abolished, the effect would be to add only another
ten percent to the cases in which the employer is liable, making a total
of about twenty-seven percent of all industrial accidents which could
even theoretically form the basis of a recovery. That was the best a
common-law system based on fault could possibly hope to do. To give
the employee protection from the inevitable accidents due to no one's
fault which accounted for forty-two percent of all accidents,"4 some
entirely new principle was needed; and to grant him benefits for the
twenty-nine percent of all injuries which resulted from his own fault
53 See BoYD, ComPENATioN rot-INiusIEs To WoRx.r3 8 (1913); DODD, Op. Cit. SU ra
note 38.
54 This proportion of accidents due to inevitable risks is confirmed by studies made by
the Minnesota and Wisconsin Labor Departments.
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required even more obviously a fundamental departure from the common
law.
The studies made in America leading up to compensation legislation
usually took the form of calculating what injured employees actually
received under the old system. The conclusions were invariably shocking.
The Illinois Commission"5 investigated 5000 industrial accidents, and
found that of 614 death cases, the families received nothing in 214 cases,
and were engaged in pending litigation in 111. The other cases were
settled for small sums averaging a few hundred dollars. The report of
the New York Commission 6 contains a number of similar tabulations,
of which the table on fatal industrial accidents in New York City in
1908 is typical: of 74 cases whose disposition was known, there was no
compensation in 43.2 per cent, and compensation under $500 in 40.5
per cent, with only 16.3 per cent receiving between $500 and $5,000.
Even these figures do not tell the whole story, since attorneys' fees had
to come out of these meagre sums and averaged a fourth to a third of
the amount recovered, according to the New York Commission's study.
When funeral and other expenses were also deducted, it became clear
enough that the pre-compensation loss-adjustment system for industrial
accidents was a complete failure and in most serious cases left the
worker's family destitute.
5 7
IV. ORIGINS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(a) History and characteristics of German insurance legislation
The story of English and American common law and legislation up
to this point has done no more than set the stage for the entrance of
the new compensation principle. It explains how an intolerable situation
developed which impelled the English and American jurisdictions,
steeped as they were in individualistic traditions, one by one to accept
what must at the time have seemed a radical, indeed alien, and even
socialistic, innovation. But the story so far does not explain where the
compensation principle itself came from; for that, it is necessary to
interrupt our chronological sequence and take a fresh start in nineteenth-
century Prussia.
In 1838, one year after Lord Abinger announced the fellow-servant
rule,-8 and four years before Judge Shaw of Massachusetts popularized
55 REPORT OF ILLINOIS Co~arssioN, Edwin R. Wright, Secretary.
-6 25 N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 38, Appendix III (1910).
57 See summary of other studies in BoYD, COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES TO WORKIEW, C.
5 (1913).
58 See note 35 supra.
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the defense of assumption of risk, 9 Prussia enacted a law making rail-
roads liable to their employees (as well as passengers) for accidents
from all causes except act of God and negligence of the plaintiff. In 1854,
Prussia required employers in certain industries to contribute one-half to
the sickness association funds formed under various local statutes. In
1876 an unsuccessful voluntary insurance act was passed, and finally in
1884 Germany adopted the first modern compensation system, thirteen
years before England, twenty-five years before the first American juris-
diction, and sixty-five years before the last American state.
It is interesting to inquire into the conditions which gave birth to the
compensation idea. As to the intellectual origins: both philosophers
and politicians played a part. Frederick the Great contributed both a
profound conviction that "it is the duty of the state to provide sustenance
and support of those of its citizens who cannot provide sustenance for
themselves,"6 and a completely uninhibited view of the state's power
and right to bring this protection about by any means. Among the
philosophers, probably Fichte was most responsible for propounding the
idea that many of the misfortunes, disabilities and accidents of individuals
are ultimately social and not individual in origin, and that the state is
therefore "not to be negative nor to have a mere police function, but to
be filled with Christian concern, especially for the weaker members."'"
Lassalle, Sismondi, Winkelblech, Wagner and Schaeffle developed this
general conception into insistent and eloquent arguments for the only
mechanism which could effectively implement this ideal: industrial
insurance.2 At the same time, especially during the years following the
war of 1870-71, Bismarck began to be concerned about the increasing
strength shown in elections by the Marxian type of socialists as against
the practical socialists of the school of Lassalle, who favored the co-
operative association type of development. Accordingly, in 1881 he met
the situation by laying before the Reichstag his far-reaching plan for
compulsory insurance, which was enacted in various measures between
1883 and 1887.1 Thus, while Workmen's Compensation has a "social-
istic" origin in the philosophical sense of the term associated with the
views of Fichte and Hegel, it also has an anti-socialistic origin if the term
is used in the Marxian sense.
59 See note 36 supra.
60 FoURTn SPECIAL REPORT OF THME COannSSIONER Or LABOR 25-26 (1893).
61 Id. at 20.
62 Id. at 20-26.
63 Fundamental Law of 1884 (Industry, Transport, Trades, Telegraph, Army and
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The exact form taken by .the German system should be specially noted,
because it was significantly different from the English and American
systems, and because it is continuing to exert a strong influence on the
form taken by social legislation of all kinds. The distinguishing feature
of German insurance (apart from its much greater comprehensiveness)
was that contributions by the workman himself were an integral part of
the system. Broadly, the German plan fell into three parts: the Sickness
Fund (workers contributing two-thirds, employer one-third) paid benefits
for the first thirteen weeks of either sickness or disability due to accident;
the Accident Fund (contributions by employers only) paid for disability
after the first thirteen weeks; and Disability Insurance (workers con-
tribute one-half) provided for disability due to old age or other causes
not specifically covered elsewhere. The plan, though compulsory, was
thus essentially based on mutual association. The administration was
placed in the hands of representatives of employers and employees under
government supervision. The striking resemblance of this plan to the
present British system is at once apparent.
It seems paradoxical on the surface that Germany, with its more
socialistic philosophical tradition, should produce a system which is
more individualistic in the sense that the workman in effect purchases
in his own right an insurance policy against sickness and disability, with
the employer sharing the premium; while America followed what might
appear to be a more radical line by imposing unilateral liability without
fault upon the employer, and by making him bear the entire burden of
any insurance against that liability. There are several reasons for this.
The choice of this mechanism in Germany was dictated largely by the
existence of already successful schemes on this pattern within the German
guilds (Knappschaftskassen). For hundreds of years these guilds had
sponsored benefit societies and associations which provided disability,
sickness and death benefits. In a highly developed system, such as the
miners' societies, there were benefits on the insurance principle for sick-
ness, accident, and burial, and pensions for orphans, widows and
invalids."4 The system was administered by a committee made up half
of employers and half of employees, and contributions were in the same
proportion, with the employer paying the "premium" and deducting the
employee's half from his next wage payment.
The New York Commission, whose report of March, 1910, was the
basis for New York's Compensation Act, studied the German plan, and
made the following report:"
64 FouRTH SPECiAL RFPORT OF Tm Co l mSII om or LABOR 37 (1893).
65 See 25 N.Y. SEN. Dc. No. 38, p. 67 (1910).
[Vol. 3 7
ORIGINS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Could we see a practical way to put a scheme of compensation in force
in which the employer's share will be the 50 per cent. of earnings recom-
mended in our bills, and the workmen's contribution say 25 per cent.
above that, and the benefits insured to him thereby changed to three-
fourths earnings during disability, we would recommend it. The German
system on some such lines seems admirable. But practically we see no
way to accomplish this by force of compulsory law.
The American pattern, then, became that of unilateral employer
liability, with no contribution by employees. The issue is by no means
dead, however, what with the contributory principle appearing in the
British comprehensive system, in the state non-occupational disability
plans that have been adopted,66 and, of course, in old age and unemploy-
ment legislation. It is most significant, therefore, to note that the New
York Commission rejected the employee-contribution system only be-
cause of doubt that compulsory contributions could constitutionally be
exacted, and that but for this doubt they would have recommended it..
No doubt the American pattern was also influenced by the fact that
such recovery for industrial injury as the employee had obtained in the
past had always taken the form of an adversary imposition of liability
upon the employer, so that it was perhaps natural to conceive of even
this totally new principle of employee protection in terms of the old
mechanism of employer liability.
(b) Development of Workmen's Compensation in the United States
By the end of the nineteenth century, as shown above, the coincidence
of increasing industrial injuries and decreasing remedies had produced
in the United States a situation ripe for radical change, and when, in
1893, a full account of the German system written by John Graham
Brooks was published,67 legislators all over the country seized upon it as
a clue to the direction which efforts at reform might take. Another stim-
ulus was provided by the enactment of the first British Compensation
Act in 189768 which later became the model of state acts in many respects.
A period of intensive investigation ensued, carried on by various state
commissions, beginning with Massachusetts in 1904, Illinois in 1907,
Connecticut in 1908 and a legislatively-created commission of repre-
sentatives, industrialists and other experts in New York in 1909. By
1910 the movement was in full swing, with commissions being created
by Congress and the legislatures of Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
66 California, CAL. GEN. LAWS, 8780d, § 1 et seq. (Deering 1944); New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-25 to 43:21-56 (1937); New York Laws of 1949, c. 600; Rhode
Island, Acts and Resolves of R.I. c. 1200 (1942).
67 FoVRTu SPrzrAL REPORT OF TmE CommaIssIomNR OF LABOR 25-26 (1893).
68 60 and 61 Vict. c. 37 (1897).
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Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Montana and Washington.
In 1910 also there occurred a conference in Chicago attended by repre-
sentatives of all these commissions, at which a Uniform Workmen's
Compensation Law was drafted. 9 Although the state acts which fol-
lowed were anything but uniform, the discussions at this conference did
much to set the fundamental pattern of legislation.
As to actual enactments, the story begins modestly with a rather
narrow co-operative Accident Fund for miners passed by Maryland in
1902,70 which quietly expired when held unconstitutional in an unappealed
lower court decision. 1 In 1909 another miners' compensation act was
passed in Montana,7" and suffered the same fate.7" In 1908 Congress
passed a compensation Act covering certain federal employees. 74
In 1910 the first New York Act75 was passed, with compulsory coverage
of certain "hazardous employments". It was held unconstitutional in
1911 by the Court of Appeals in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.,1 6 on
the ground that the imposition of liability without fault upon the employer
was a taking of property without due process of law under the state and
federal constitutions. At the present time, with the constitutionality of
all types of compensation acts firmly established, there is no practical
purpose to be served by tracing out the elaborate and violent consti-
tutional law arguments provoked by the early acts.7 7 One important
practical result did, however, flow from these preliminary constitutional
setbacks: the very fear of unconstitutionality impelled the legislatures
to pass over the ideal type of coverage, which would be both compre-
hensive and compulsory, in favor of more awkward and fragmentary
plans whose very weakness and incompleteness might ensure their
constitutional validity. And so, beginning with New Jersey, "elective"
or "optional" statutes became common, under which employers could
choose whether or not they would be bound by the compensation plan,
with the alternative of being subject to common-law actions without
benefit of the three common-law defenses. Similarly, a number of states
limited their coverage to "hazardous" employments because of doubt as
69 See account of this conference in BOYD, COMPENSATION FOR INJURES TO WoRXNMN
17-22 (1913).
70 Md. Laws 1902, c. 139.
71 Franklin v. United R. R. & Electric Co. of Baltimore, 2 Baltimore City Rep. 390 (1904).
72 Mont. Laws 1909, c. 67.
73 Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554 (1911).
74 35 STAT. 556 (1908).
75 N.Y. Laws 1910, c. 674.
76 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
77 See, for example, BoYD, COMPENSATiON FOR INjuorES TO WORKMEN 153-204 (1913).
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to the extent of the police power, and while several have since broadened
their scope,7" there remain nine states with this limitation.79
In New York, the Ives decision was answered by the adoption in
1913 of a constitutional amendment permitting a compulsory law, and
such a law was passed in the same year. In 1917 this compulsory law, °
together with the Iowa elective-type8' and the Washington exclusive-
state-fund-type law," was held constitutional by the United States
Supreme Court, and, with fears of constitutional impediments virtually
removed, the compensation system grew and expanded with a rapidity
that probably has no parallel in any comparable field of law.
By 1920 all but eight states had adopted Compensation Acts, and on
January 1, 1949, the last state, Mississippi, came under the system.
Extension of coverage has taken the form, not only of adding jurisdic-
tions, but of broadening the boundaries of individual acts, as to persons,
employments, and kinds of injury (particularly occupational disease)
covered. At the same time, where election is permissible, the percentage
of employers choosing compensation coverage has constantly increased
until in most states the non-electing employer is exceptional. Arthur
H. Reede, in his detailed study of compensation coverage entitled
"Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation", concludes, after an analysis
of coverage by states, that in 1915 the percentage of all gainful employees
(excluding unemployed and self-employed) covered by compensation
acts was 41.2; in 1920, 67.4; in 1930, 75.2; and in 1940, 8 1 .5.'
The principal occupational groups not yet brought within compensation
acts are domestic and agricultural workers, who are excluded from
almost all acts. Other exclusions are accounted for by small firms (since
most acts exempt employers with less than a stated minimum number
of employees), "casual workers", and workers who do not come within
the classes of hazardous employment in states containing that limitation.
The percentage of coverage looks slightly better if interstate rail
employees, considered excluded in the above calculation, are included,
since they have the protection of the Employers' Liability Act, which is
78 Arizona, Illinois, New Hampshire, and New York.
79 Maryland, New Mexico, Washington, Wyoming ("extra-hazardous"); Louisiana,
Oklahoma, Oregon ("hazardous"); Kansas ("especially dangerous"); and Montana ("in-
herently hazardous").
80 New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, L. R. A. 1917D, 1 Ann. Cas.
1917D, 629 (1917).
81 Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U.S. 210 (1917).
82 Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642
(1917).
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regarded by some segments of railway labor as preferable to Workmen's
Compensation Acts. 4 The enactment of the Mississippi act also improves
the coverage figure somewhat.
CONCLUSION
This summary of the history and nature of the American workmen's
compensation system is intended to show that, although it has left
behind most traces of tort law, and although its philosophy stems from
continental industrial insurance, it is a unique system which is neither
delictual nor socialistic in principle. If this analysis has succeeded, it
will aid in preventing the two erroneous 6xtremes of interpretation that
run throughout all compensation law: on the one hand, the extreme of
thwarting the social purposes of the legislation by the importation of
common-law restrictions, and, on the other hand, the equally-unjustified
extreme of indiscriminately resolving difficult questions in favor of the
claimant on the theory that his position is the same as that of the
beneficiary of a personal insurance policy or of a comprehensive public
social security system.
84 See Richter and Forer, The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 36 CoaRN L.Q. 203
(1951).
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